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mixer.h
/* Redis implementation for vector sets. The data structure itself * is implemented in hnsw.c. * * Copyright (c) 2009-Present, Redis Ltd. * All rights reserved. * * Licensed under your choice of (a) the Redis Source Available License 2.0 * (RSALv2); or (b) the Server Side Public License v1 (SSPLv1); or (c) the * GNU Affero General Public License v3 (AGPLv3). * Originally authored by: Salvatore Sanfilippo. * * ============================================================================= * * Mixing function for HNSW link integrity verification * Designed to resist collision attacks when salts are unknown. */ #include <stdint.h> #include <string.h> static inline uint64_t ROTL64(uint64_t x, int r) { return (x << r) | (x >> (64 - r)); } // Use more rounds and stronger constants #define MIX_PRIME_1 0xFF51AFD7ED558CCDULL #define MIX_PRIME_2 0xC4CEB9FE1A85EC53ULL #define MIX_PRIME_3 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15ULL #define MIX_PRIME_4 0xBF58476D1CE4E5B9ULL #define MIX_PRIME_5 0x94D049BB133111EBULL #define MIX_PRIME_6 0x2B7E151628AED2A7ULL /* Mixer design goals: * 1. Thorough mixing of the level parameter. * 2. Enough rounds of mixing. * 3. Cross-influence between h1 and h2. * 4. Domain separation to prevent related-key attacks. */ void secure_pair_mixer_128(uint64_t salt0, uint64_t salt1, uint64_t id1_in, uint64_t id2_in, uint64_t level, uint64_t* out_h1, uint64_t* out_h2) { // Order independence (A -> B links should hash as B -> A links). uint64_t id_a = (id1_in < id2_in) ? id1_in : id2_in; uint64_t id_b = (id1_in < id2_in) ? id2_in : id1_in; // Domain separation: mix salts with a constant to prevent // related-key attacks. uint64_t h1 = salt0 ^ 0xDEADBEEFDEADBEEFULL; uint64_t h2 = salt1 ^ 0xCAFEBABECAFEBABEULL; // First, thoroughly mix the level into both accumulators // This prevents predictable level values from being a weakness uint64_t level_mix = level; level_mix *= MIX_PRIME_5; level_mix ^= level_mix >> 32; level_mix *= MIX_PRIME_6; h1 ^= level_mix; h2 ^= ROTL64(level_mix, 31); // Mix in id_a with strong diffusion. h1 ^= id_a; h1 *= MIX_PRIME_1; h1 = ROTL64(h1, 23); h1 *= MIX_PRIME_2; // Mix in id_b. h2 ^= id_b; h2 *= MIX_PRIME_3; h2 = ROTL64(h2, 29); h2 *= MIX_PRIME_4; // Three rounds of cross-mixing for better security. for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) { // Cross-influence. uint64_t tmp = h1; h1 += h2; h2 += tmp; // Mix h1. h1 ^= ROTL64(h1, 31); h1 *= MIX_PRIME_1; h1 ^= salt0; // Mix h2. h2 ^= ROTL64(h2, 37); h2 *= MIX_PRIME_2; h2 ^= salt1; } // Finalization with avalanche rounds. h1 ^= h1 >> 33; h1 *= MIX_PRIME_3; h1 ^= h1 >> 29; h1 *= MIX_PRIME_4; h1 ^= h1 >> 32; h2 ^= h2 >> 33; h2 *= MIX_PRIME_5; h2 ^= h2 >> 29; h2 *= MIX_PRIME_6; h2 ^= h2 >> 32; *out_h1 = h1; *out_h2 = h2; }